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Philosophical hermeneutics claims that human understanding, while being con-
tingent and historical, is likewise universal and bears within itself some perva-
sive features detectable via hermeneutical analyses of historically imparted tradi-
tion and language. Similarly, hermeneutical philosophy of science is condent that
hermeneutical methods are the only proper tool to adequately assess, reconstruct,
explain or give ameaning to historical but universal scientic knowledge and its var-
ious forms. I point out two versions of hermeneutical philosophy of science and ar-
gue that whenever philosophical hermeneutics pursues rescuing “scienticity”, hu-
man rationality, human rights, common values, and so forth under the pretence of
its universality and competence, it necessarily transcends and violates the tenets of
its own. I conclude in the favour of moderate interpretation of practical hermeneu-
tics, perhaps in the very essence of it rest postmodern concepts of historicality,
transparency and tolerance, without which there is no possibility of extricating one-
self from hermeneuticism.
Keywords: hermeneutical philosophy of science, neopragmatism, philosophy of sci-
entic practices, P. Heelan, D. Ginev, J. Rouse
1.
Well-known hermeneuticists Robert Crease, Patrick Heelan, Martin Eger,
Don Ihde and others gave great eorts to assess the impact of hermeneutical
thought to themainstreamphilosophy of science and to associate hermeneu-
tical philosophy with natural sciences and technology. To present their re-
search even in the briefest form would not be appropriate here, moreover, I
cast no doubts on the importance of hermeneutics’ ambition to supply “the
philosophical foundation for reintroducing history and culture into the phi-
losophy of the natural sciences” and I acknowledge its merits introducing
and anchoring the idea that “scientic knowledge [. . . ] deals with meanings
Corresponding author’s address: Evaldas Juozelis, Mykolas Romeris University, Philosophy
Department, Ateities 20, LT-08303, Vilnius, Lithuania. Email: ejuozelis@mruni.eu.
© All Copyright Author




that are social entities, embodied in language, altered or fullled in experi-
ence, and passed on in laboratory praxes and scientic literature and cul-
ture” (Crease 1997, 259).erefore in this paper I intend to focus not on the
common ground of hermeneutical philosophy of science, but on the partic-
ular hermeneutical interest, namely, “the role that hermeneutical philoso-
phy could play in understanding science” (Crease 1997, 259). If according
to Crease science has a historical space, or “here and now,” “with its own
reference to an (historical) authenticating judge and witness”, it is unclear,
though, what the aforementioned “reintroduction” of history and culture
into the philosophy of science is supposed to mean: A) a proposal to restore
the previously rejected idea of science as a socio-historical enterprise that
lends priority to language and experience (in other words, that scientic un-
derstanding, at least in part, is hermeneutical and phenomenological), or yet
B) a more rigid demand to show that the validity or condence of scientic
knowledge is based upon a philosophical-hermeneutical core or foundation.
In section II, I outline Heelan’s issue on relation between philosophical
hermeneutics and natural science and point out that despite his attempt to
proclaim a relatively neutral image of hermeneutics towards natural science,
Heelan perhaps undeliberately engages amode of foundationalist philosoph-
ical regime as a legitimating basis of scientic knowing. In section III, I
consider Dimitri Ginev’s version of philosophical hermeneutics compared
to philosophy of scientic practices of JosephRouse and suggest that to thor-
oughly understand the diverse modes of intertwining of hermeneutics and
science one should invoke a “politically” biased philosophical framework
that is more apt to disclose an adequate picture of science as a cultural and
social entity. In section IV, I state that in my interpretation Rouse’s as well as
Rorty’s attitude cannot be set in any version of hermeneuticism, since dier-
ently from all sorts of hermeneuticism it purports an ongoing questioning of
any philosophical foundations on the grounds of practical, political milieu.
2.
Referring to Heelan, Crease stresses that EdmundHusserl criticized not sci-
ence itself, but the Galilean assumption that mathematics alone provides
the ontology of nature, thus bypassing the life-world; what follows is that
Husserl (and laterMartinHeidegger) diagnose “a historical crisis which they
attributed to the hegemonic role of theory in the arbitration of meaning,
the eacement of the role of the embodied human subjects in the consti-
tution of knowledge, and the implicit assumption, characteristic of moder-
nity, that the natural sciences provide the privileged model for human in-
quiry” (Crease 1997, 259–260). Supposedly it illustrates the hereinbefore
stated play of hermeneutical philosophy in understanding science, neverthe-
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less the hermeneutical role playing remains ambiguous. By this hermeneu-
tical reintroducing we are inclined to acknowledge that there is something
deeply wrongwith our understanding; but is that understanding scientic or
philosophical-hermeneutical? What or who (if we vindicate the role of the
embodied human subjects) constitutes knowledge? Intuitively one would
expect (as the intimate logic of an argument implies) that any phenomeno-
logical hermeneuticist would aim at restoring the once lost ontological sig-
nicance of natural sciences, for instance, by incorporating “into the phi-
losophy of science those aspects of historicality, culture, and tradition that
are absent from the traditional analysis of theory and explanation”, and/or
by re-orientating “the current discussion about scientic realism around the
hermeneutics ofmeaning and truth in science” (Heelan 1998, 273). Butmore
importantly, Heelan insists that “we do not ask of a philosophy that it con-
tribute to the successful practice of science” (Heelan 1998, 293). So what is at
issue here is the engagement of hermeneutical thinking into scientic prac-
tices. If there is a hermeneutics of science, i.e. scientic knowledge func-
tions, at least to some extent, hermeneutically (option A above) (as Crease
puts it: “e days are gone when it could be seriously debated whether a
hermeneutical perspective on the natural sciences exists” Crease 1997, 261),
an appropriate issue would be not the problematization of the possibility of
a hermeneutics of natural science, but the mode of its engagement, or a type
of intertwining of hermeneutics and science.
In another paper Heelan (in symbolic tandem with Jay Schulkin) dis-
cusses “a political society such as ours”. He warns that
it may be a mistake to suppose that the current questioning of the
agenda of scientic culture by public agencies and media indicates
a ‘ight from rationality’ or a lapse of public condence in scientic
knowledge, rather than a general failure of public institutions includ-
ing scientic ones to present a believable culturally attuned and his-
torical account of science. (Heelan and Schulkin 1998, 294)
us, the abovementioned re-orientation is seemingly not just a formal
intellectual posture, but a practical and political (in a broader sense—as a
strategy of a certain human activity and thinking as well as a setting of ma-
terial and social technologies) move. Moreover, it requires a particular re-
sponsibility, or accountability, the subtlety of whichomas Kuhn, in Hee-
lan’s eyes, failed to identify:
He failed, however, as most others have failed too, to give a good
philosophical account of historical theory change and the cultural
construction of scientic entities. Hermeneutical philosophy and a
hermeneutically sensitive pragmatism could fare better [. . . ] together
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with the social and cultural studies of science. Such an accomplish-
ment would provide elements for a better scholarly and public ap-
preciation of what is certainly one of the greatest institutions of our
society. (Heelan and Schulkin 1998, 294)
So, do we need or not a (hermeneutical) philosophy that contributes
to the successful practice of science? e answer is quite obvious. Heelan
corroborates the demand in the following words:
In this work [to construct and interpret the meaning of scientic un-
derstanding] lies the signicance and power of hermeneutic method
and hermeneutic philosophy for the history and philosophy of sci-
ence. And not just for these, but also for understanding how quanti-
tative empirical methods function in science to give meaning to em-
pirical contents, in particular, how measurement equipment plays a
double role creating both theoretical and cultural meanings, and how
theory-laden data depend on the successful public self-presentation
in measurement of the measured entity as a public cultural entity.
[. . . ] Interpretative work of this kind is clearly historical, cultural,
and anthropological, multidisciplinary in character and in need of a
philosophical foundation which hermeneutical philosophy [. . . ] tries
to provide. (Heelan 1997, 278, italics mine)
In the same article and in the paper written with Schulkin for the jour-
nal Synthese about the desirable synthesis of hermeneutics and pragmatism,
Heelan conclusively stresses the fact that
so-called ‘theoretical entities’ are naturalizable in the lifeworld through
science-based technologies and thereby become public cultural and
perceptual entities. ese principles [of hermeneutic method as a
process] which span both pragmatism and hermeneutical philosophy
can found a new empiricism and restore kinship with the scientic
revolution that began not with Descartes or Boyle, but with the em-
piricism of Galileo. (Heelan and Schulkin 1998, 294)
It does not seem to me aer all that here we deal with an unpretentious
collaboration of philosophical and scientic discourses. What is under way
is not a kind of restoration of “historical justice” concerning continental phi-
losophy of science that Crease (regretting about the unexplored hermeneu-
tical pole of a hermeneutic-positivist binary as a potential resource) had in
mind, but the shi (or revolution) in the scientically-philosophical dis-
course itself.e so-calledweaknesses of the positivist-inspired understand-
ing of science are being compensated here not by Crease’s good-willing
deeper appreciation of hermeneutical dimensions of sciences, but by impos-
ing a kind of “naturalized” version of sophisticated pragmatistic/new empiri-
cist thinking with a avour of politically biased partiality. In other words,
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hermeneutical discourse proposed by Heelan allegedly regiments the rules
of the intellectual play among various scientically inclined philosophical
narratives, and does so with a permission of its “hermeneutical method”
(recall that “interpretative work of this kind” is not only in need of a philo-
sophical foundation, but that the foundation in need is hermeneutical) or
actually by sanctioning and self-legitimizing its own universality (option B
above). What is needed in addition is just to clothe any possible rival in
hermeneutical dress, and all potential opposition seemingly disappears.
3.
If I am right at least in part, then it possibly sheds some light on Dimitri
Ginev’s attitude towards Heelan’s initiative. Ginev writes:
Like many ‘internal critics’ of the analytical tradition, Heelan blames
the mainstream philosophy of science for neglecting the social-his-
torical-instrumental context of scientic practices. Strangely enough,
he invests more eorts in criticising Continental philosophy’s pictures of
science. Traditional hermeneutic phenomenology and philosophical
hermeneutics fail to see that scientic research discloses ‘new per-
ceptual horizons’. e critique of science in terms of a hermeneutic
ontology of laboratory research practices is a criticism of scientism
as ‘objectivist ideology’ of modern science. By no means, however,
this critique would tolerate an ideological attack on scientic practices.
(Ginev 2006, 66–67, italics mine)
But it is not strange at all, if one considers the scope and depth of the
hermeneutical project. Recall Heelan’s interpretation of Husserl’s objection
to the Galilean assumption that the ontology of nature is provided by math-
ematics. Husserl and Heidegger could not recognize how important and
revolutionary the hegemonic role of theory in the arbitration of meaning re-
ally was, and how necessary is nally to restore the so-called new (“strong”)
hermeneutic empiricism of Heelan. What else is it if not a characteristically
modern approach that the natural sciences provide the privileged model for
human inquiry? Husserl, Heidegger, and especially Gadamer were too cau-
tious and too little scientic in “hermeneutically naturalizing” (i.e. in restor-
ing the ontological signicance of natural sciences, in incorporating into the
philosophy of science conceptual frameworks of historicality, culture and
tradition, in re-orientating scientic realism around the hermeneutics of
meaning and truth in science and re-establishing the relationship between
the current philosophy of natural science and hermeneutical philosophy, as
Heelan intends to do) the natural realm.
Moreover, I think Ginev hits the nail on the head issuing another aspect
of the quandary: namely its ideological charge. I refer to Richard Rorty:
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‘[H]ermeneutics’ is not the name for a discipline, nor for a method
of achieving the sort of results which epistemology failed to achieve,
nor for a program of research. On the contrary, hermeneutics is an
expression of hope that the cultural space le by the demise of epis-
temology will not be lled—that our culture should become one in
which the demand for constraint and confrontation is no longer felt
[. . . ] We must be hermeneutical where we do not understand what is
happening but are honest enough to admit it, rather than being bla-
tantly ‘Whiggish’ about it. is means that we can get epistemologi-
cal commensuration only where we already have agreed-upon prac-
tices of inquiry (or, more generally, of discourse)—as easily in ‘aca-
demic’ art, ‘scholastic’ philosophy, or ‘parliamentary’ politics as in
‘normal’ science. [. . . ] If we draw the line between epistemology and
hermeneutics as I have been drawing it—as a contrast between dis-
course about normal and about abnormal discourse—then it seems
clear that the two do not compete, but rather help each other out.
[. . . ] Hermeneutics is not ‘another way of knowing’—‘understanding’
as opposed to (predictive) ‘explanation’. It is better seen as another
way of coping. (Rorty 1979, 315, 321, 346, 356)
Rorty’s interpretation of hermeneutics is also quite obviously politically
(“ideologically”) dened, but by the same token it underlines matters of
tolerance: it concerns democratic ideals of freedom, equality and self-
expression (“liberal democracy”). If according to Rorty hermeneutics is an
intellectual platform absent of constraint and confrontation, it necessarily
contributes to democratization processes as an edifying discourse.e im-
portant question is how tolerant the hermeneutical platform has to be and
to what degree it itself is tolerable. As the saying is the only constraint on
the principle of tolerance is non-tolerance of intolerants. ere always is a
spot or point or mark in the intellectual structure that is vulnerable, in this
instance—the historicality of hermeneutical initiative.
Hermeneutics thus aligns itself with radically democratic politics,
since it denies that we can nd security or grounding for our particu-
lar interpretation of what achieving our country involves. In particu-
lar, it denies that we can look to ahistorical notions of human rights,
which serve only to limit in advance the options available for our fu-
ture. [. . . ] Here, however, Rorty misses an opportunity within our
hermeneutic situation that his own appeal to hermeneutics illumi-
nates.e use Rorty makes of Gadamer suggests that because we are
thrown into a history and a vocabulary, neither of which we can es-
cape without losing our framework of understanding, we can revise
and reconsider that framework only through a process ofBildung that
involves examining our assumptions fromwithin, in terms ofwhatwe
understand of and from others. [. . . ] For this reason, it would seem
that hermeneutics requires the fullest range of perspectives possible
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and, perhaps ironically, it has to be wary precisely of those that would
seek to restrict this range. (Warnke 2003, 116)
Whether Rorty in fact misses the opportunity given by hermeneutics to
reconsider and critically evaluate those elements of philosophical discourse
that obviate alternative ways of “coping”, is another matter, but I guess it
echoes precisely the situation I want to elaborate concerning Heelan’s and
Ginev’s hermeneuticism. As a constant follower of the former, Ginev by no
means, but in his own way would tolerate any critique of hermeneutical rea-
son, because straightforwardly identies it with “ideological” attack, as if
hermeneutics itself represents some “natural kind” of ahistorical philosoph-
ical interpretation.
And here Ginev’s attack on Joseph Rouse’s “politics of postmodern phi-
losophy of science” is quite informative. To cut a long story short, Rouse’s
philosophy of scientic practices is a conceptual model of an engagement in
scientic practices and their political signicance that implies that a poli-
tically-oriented human self-consciousness is detectable even in a specic
medium formed by those practices. is kind of discourse refers to itself
as a scientic self-identity being directed towards practico-theoretical un-
derstanding of science, which can also be evaluated as a political undertak-
ing (Rouse 1991, 1996, 2002). Ginev (2005, 2006) opposes to this kind of
“politics” and alerts that the successive destruction of the cognitive auton-
omy of science poses a threat to the democratization processes of modern
societies. Ginev’s version of phenomenological hermeneutics (namely, cog-
nitive existentialism) lays claims to having discovered a new “philosophical
identity” of science beyond scientism, essentialism and representationism,
but unlike the “postmodern policy” trend of philosophy of scientic prac-
tices hopes to develop a philosophical program for science, which is to be
achieved through an internal (hermeneutic) reection upon scientic prac-
tices (option B), and not by means of imposing, so Ginev argues, external
aims of social and cultural criticism, thereby gently opposingRouse’s habit to
not clearly separate the content of science disciplines and its outward social
and cultural assessment (option A above).
But what are the “internal” mechanisms of scientic “democratization”?
e argument goes as following: Rouse does not suggest an adequate philo-
sophical framework for addressing the issue of the contextuality of scientic
knowledge within the dynamics of scientic practices and fails to under-
stand scientic practices philosophically, because his conception does not
have the resources to give accounts of the interpretative constitution of sci-
ence’s theoretical knowledge that resists structural changes through its ongo-
ing “recontextualization”. His deationary accounts do not suggest genuine
arguments against science’s epistemic autonomy and his move from prag-
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matic deationism (which “ provides accounts of how the sciences can be
developed freely, without arbitrary constraint”) to a kind of naturalism does
not provide a remedy for removing this deciency; but precisely the philo-
sophical reection does reject deationism and implies an antiessentialist
defense of science’s cognitive specicity and epistemic autonomy (Ginev
2005, 193). I think Ginev is right that there is a political moment involved in
Rouse’s claim that the contextuality and situatedness of the practices them-
selves suce to understand them and that anybody who has a social-prag-
matic relation to the particular contexts and situations in which these prac-
tices take place (i.e. anybody who is involved in a certain epistemic align-
ment) may participate in the ‘local assessments’ of the epistemic status of
scientic activities and achievements, that is the deationary accounts oer
the opportunity for assessing scientic knowledge in a democratic manner
(Ginev 2005, 194). As Steve Fuller once noticed, “for Rouse, ‘science’ lies
in the composite generative capacity of the individuals who recognize each
other as scientists”.
[I]f the current members of the scientic community came to test
their hypotheses against the scores of football matches and were sat-
ised with the results, and the larger society continued to defer to the
scientists’ authority, then betting on football matches would consti-
tute scientic experimentation. (Fuller 2003, 476–475)
Sticking to the point, Ginev captures Rouse’s expression of “normative
anaemia”, meaning
the lack of resources needed to criticize specic scientic practices on
the grounds of their own arguments and concerns. In contrast to the
anormative descriptivismofmainstreamphilosophy of science, a nor-
mative criticism of scientic practices would change-so Rouse’s argu-
ment goes-the status of the sciences within the public sphere. Conse-
quently, the politics of postmodern critical engagement with the sci-
ences opposes all philosophical programmes that are not equipped
to enquire into the role the sciences play in the public sphere (Ginev
2005, 195).
What follows next is Ginev’s confession that aer all the honest eorts
he had not found “in Rouse’s publications even an example that shows how,
within scenarios of cultural studies, a normative criticism of scientic prac-
tices can overcome the normative anaemia” (Ginev 2005, 195). Why? I sus-
pect that the initial obstacle is the misrecognition of the politics of post-
modern philosophy of science (and eventually cultural studies of science)
as a philosophical program, but rather as a new “political-normative atti-
tude”. is implication rests upon Ginev’s cognitive existentialism which
inherently dismantles all the discourses of postmodern kind as eclectic and
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unfounded. e second reason rests on Ginev’s eort to impute to Rouse a
populist position of Paul Feyerabend, according to whom the state-funded
science must be accountable to the state or its representatives—“committees
of laymen”. However, this claim totally distorts Rouse’s concepts of practices
as “epistemic alignments” and “patterns of situated activity”.e third reason
lies in Ginev’s category of “politics”: he ignores the fact that Rouse explic-
itly claims that at certain stages of practico-theoretical elaboration political,
epistemic, ethical, and other statements are of equal importance on the basis
of power-knowledge dynamics.at is, alignments of power without com-
ponents of knowledge (and vice versa) are unintelligible, but it does not say
that they can be reduced to one another, as if a scientic statement would
inevitably be a political manifesto.
Andnally, the fourth reason ofGinev’s “anaemia”: I feel a little confused
by his criticism that Rouse’s normativism does not exhibit any positive out-
come for the socio-cultural medium. Properly speaking, you may require
something similar of “unphilosophical”, ideologically and pragmatically-
minded doctrine, but Ginev also frankly admits that the essence of cog-
nitive existentialism (“—a conception that treats science as a dynamics of
research practices in which cognitive content is constituted and ‘situated’
within open (practical and theoretical) horizons of doing research”, Ginev
2007, 68) is best disclosed by Nicholas Rescher’s tenet of “objective pragma-
tism” (“Objective pragmatism, as it is developed by Rescher, defends [sci-
ence’s cognitive] specicity in terms of a theory of the process of rational
selection in cognitive evolution”, Ginev 2007, 58) and its “anti-ideological”
stance that would likely resist the legitimizing narrative. If Rouse and Rorty
promote subjective pragmatism (which is still to be recognized as a political-
normative attitude, rather than the program of research) and nevertheless
are required to deliver some tangible results, is the objective pragmatism an
exception? I did not nd in Ginev’s texts even an example.
4.
Regretting that the edice of Rouse is so irrelevant to the scientic research,
Ginev admits that non-radical versions of antiessentialism (i.e. cognitive
existentialism) fail to defeat the circular argument in the form of petitio
principii, and to a certain extent circularity is unavoidable in any strategy
of defending science’s cognitive specicity. So the task of any trustworthy
hermeneutical strategy is not to eliminate circularity radically, but rather to
reformulate it as a hermeneutic circle “that can come to grips with the in-
trinsic circularity of the interplay between ‘practical theorizing’ (carrying
out particular research practices, which are theory-laden) and ‘theoretical
praxis’ (articulation of cognitive content by realizing possibilities embedded
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in the interrelatedness of practices) in a scientic domain” (Ginev 2007, 71).
Here at the end we are supposed to realize where the cognitive specicity
comes from: “e cognitive organization of this research process is therefore
shaped by the epistemology and methodology of the interpretive themati-
zation and the intrinsic rhetoric of the interpretive self-reection” (Ginev
1998, 264). But Ginev is familiar with Rouse’s and Mark Okrent’s notice that
the argument from the self-interpreting status of human beings as cultural
agents to the special cognitive structure of the human sciences is a non se-
quitur, and is fair enough to admit again, that self-interpretation is a part
of each mode of cultural existence and it does not follow “that the sciences
which deal with the cultural manifestations of human beings must have a
dierent cognitive structure as compared with other types of science.ere
is only a pragmatic dierence between the interpretive activities. . . ” (Ginev
1998, 263). If this is the case, then Rouse should return the complaint back to
Ginev and ask whether cognitive existentialism is not irrelevant in respect
to political reection and socio-cultural engagement of science. What if a
hermeneutic strategy simply is not the best option?
Consider again Georgia Warnke’s (2003, 116) insight: “Hermeneutics it-
self requires skepticism about some interpretations, namely, those that re-
quire or lead to the elimination of others, and it requires this skepticism
in order to enhance the expression of all those others” . Is Ginev’s a kind
of “some interpretations” we should be skeptical about? Surely it does not
belong to the Rortian space, absent of constraint and confrontation, but it
ambitiously pursues contribution to the democratization process as an ed-
ifying discourse. e philosophy of scientic practices, also being a kind
of politico-philosophical initiative, aspires to critically assess particular dis-
cursive practices of sciences as an ongoing engagement with specic so-
cial, political, cultural, economic contexts and simultaneously denies the
very possibility to politically assess science as a whole; therefore ostensibly
“marginal” parts of science (e.g. military technologies, agriculture, prac-
tices of medicine) that explicitly show the socio-political content of discur-
sive scientic practices is of major importance in the philosophy of scientic
practices. At that point, Ginev (2005, 198) raises his
main political objection against the politics of postmodern philoso-
phy of science: to demolish the demarcation line between the cog-
nitive self-organization of scientic research and the socio-political
contexts in which the research practices take place amounts to com-
mitting a false image of democracy.e genuine democratic process
of contemporary societies needs science’s cognitive autonomy. Oth-
erwise, these societies will be totally instrumentalized: science’s com-
plete contextual instrumentalization will imply a scientication of so-
cial life.
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What this “genuine democracy” is, Ginev does not specify. However, this
would mean that the program of cognitive existentialism is also a political
alternative of hermeneutics of science, vigilantly protecting the society from
the instrumentalization and scientication the postmodern condition emits.
But where does that “politics” take place? Since it cannot be based on socio-
political medium, one has to rely on established principles of hermeneutical
methodology, namely Heideggerian ontico-ontological distinction and the
concept of “translatability”: no external (political, social, etc.) factors can
inuence the cognitive content of science, until transferred into intrinsic
“hermeneutical circles” of the constitution of that content, in other words,
until they are incorporated into the internal interpretive “fore-structure” of
research process.
e natural sciences are resistant to external inuences (and able to
maintain their cognitive specicity) not because their research pro-
cess is a non-interpretative enterprise, but because of the potential
of translatability they demonstrate in each particular historical sit-
uation. eir cognitive specicity has to be dened rst and fore-
most with respect to the intrinsic hermeneutic circles constituted by
that ongoing translatability which prevents the ‘ideologization’, ‘meta-
physical nalization’, or ‘political manipulation’ of the research pro-
cess. Science maintains its cognitive autonomy not through isolation
by implementing procedures of idealization, but by means of interi-
orization based on ongoing translatability. (Ginev 2006, 21).
But if you agree with the latter, it seems that there is no danger of in-
strumentalization of modern society at all. I think that the likely translation
of the basic idea of cognitive existentialism is that science is autonomous
per se, and the only threat endangering the autonomy of science is a non-
democratic, neo-pragmatist mode of quasi-understanding, attempting to
infect the innocence of scientic enterprise with instrumentalist ideology.
5. Conclusion
So what are the threatening elements of philosophical discourse, alien to
polylogical philosophical and political public sphere? If we recur to the pre-
viouslymentioned options of hermeneutics of science, we therebymust con-
sider two modes of its engagement, or types of intertwining of hermeneu-
tics and science: one is the mode of hermeneuticism represented by a more
decent version of hermeneutics of Heelan and a rigorous version of cogni-
tive existentialism of Ginev, both subsumed under option B, and the other
mode proposed by “non-philosophical” Rorty and Rouse. According to the
rst one, hermeneutics, as Algis Mickunas wittily remarked, carries out its
historical mission, and by examining scientic theories and practices, the
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masterworks of high culture, assumes the obligation to transmit this cul-
tural knowledge into the everyday context, that is, is engaged in scientic
journalism, and seeks to give a sense to secret symbolic formulas of scien-
tic community’s high priests (Mickunas 2007, 64).
e other mode is the problematization of excessive hermeneuticism, a
moderate type of hermeneutical engagement that underlies practical condi-
tions of any state of knowing and cultural presence.
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